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Abstract
The article by Brenna and Spandonaro on interregional mobility for acute hospital care in Italy raises important issues 
concerning social and territorial equity in a healthcare system. Based on Regions and private providers’ strategic 
behavior, the hypothesis adopted to explain patient cross-border mobility (CBM), demonstrated by statistical 
analysis, may be further explored using qualitative methods. In order to reduce CBM, the central government 
needs to play a more active role in coordination, even in a highly decentralized National Health Service (NHS). 
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Introduction
Patient cross-border mobility (CBM) is a phenomenon with 
important social and economic consequences. Although it has 
been extensively studied in international literature1-4 further 
research is required. The article by Brenna and Spandonaro,5 
dedicated to interregional mobility for acute hospital care in 
Italy, is an important contribution in this respect, as it raises 
critical issues that go well beyond the Italian case, concerning 
social and territorial equity as well as the role of central and 
regional government within a National Health Service (NHS) 
system. 
Their analysis shows that the introduction of managed 
competition, based on patient choice and diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs), led Northern and Central Regions to 
increase patient inflows coming from Southern Regions, 
thus worsening the traditional North-South divide and the 
social and territorial inequalities in the Italian NHS. This 
closely relates to what happened in the 1990s and 2000s when 
decentralization was implemented, now calling for the central 
government to play a more active role in governing a highly 
regionalized healthcare system. 
NHS Regulation and Actors’ Behavior: The Drivers of 
Patient Mobility 
In their theoretical framework, Brenna and Spandonaro5 
explain patient interregional mobility by considering the 
Regions’ strategic behavior and the entrepreneurial behavior 
of private providers, which are both related to national NHS 
regulation and its implementation at Regional level. This 
framework is not common in literature, which does not usually 
consider these explaining factors. Literature does not explore 
the activity carried out by Regions and private providers in 
promoting CBM mobility while using the healthcare system 
regulation; rather it is usually neglected or taken for granted. 
On the contrary, it plays a fundamental role in explaining 
patient interregional mobility. 
As the authors illustrate, the 1992 national healthcare reform 
introduced managed competition,6 then converted into 
managed cooperation,7 based on patient freedom of choice, 
DRG-based tariffs and, since 1999, purchaser-provider 
contracts with overall ceilings, tariff caps, and cuts.8 These 
regulative devices represent the main institutional framework 
within which Regions, as well as public and private providers, 
perform strategies aimed at pursuing their goals and targets. 
Brenna and Spandonaro5 note the different ability shown 
by Northern and Southern Regions in implementing a well-
provided and good quality Regional Health Service (RHS) 
through the accreditation system. Regional differences 
in the 1990s reform implementation have already been 
analyzed in the literature, focusing on the lack of “stateness” 
or “administrative capacity” by the Southern Regions as 
explaining factors.9,10 
However, the article considers these differences in the context 
of the mobility policy adopted by Regions. Northern and 
Central Regions use their high quality public and private 
services not only to respond to resident demands and needs, 
but also to balance their budget. For this purpose, they take 
advantage of the accreditation system and of purchaser-
provider contracts in particular.
Purchaser-provider contracts (called “service agreements”) 
are usually considered as a tool to keep health expenditure 
under control, and their role is largely undervalued as they 
often represent the mere translation of Regional decisions 
on financial resource allocation, which public purchasers, 
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ie, Local Health Authorities, simply adopt without applying 
any substantial discretionary power. Instead, they may also 
be used to absorb excessive capacity and drain financial 
resources from the other Regions, as Regions with a high 
CBM positive balance do. Service agreement clauses may 
encourage hospitals to increase the services provided and 
the corresponding income, by addressing all their efforts 
to nonresident patients and therefore creating an induction 
effect. Incentives for entrepreneurial and opportunistic 
behavior are much stronger in private providers, who do not 
have access to Regional ex-post funding for any budget loss, 
as happens for public providers. 
The hypothesis is demonstrated by a statistical analysis of 
CBM which distinguishes among different types of mobility 
(boundary versus distance mobility), different hospital 
categories (identifying mobility directed to high quality/
excellence centers and to other hospitals) and nature of 
the provider (public versus private hospitals). Moreover, 
the statistical analysis is corroborated by the documentary 
analysis of Regional service agreements, as well as by some 
evidence on private provider entrepreneurial behavior. 
However, documentary analysis is only briefly outlined and 
the evidence related to private providers is simply quoted 
by other studies. Further research could be carried out 
by applying Brenna and Spandonaro’s contribution and 
therefore seeking confirmation of the article’s hypothesis 
using qualitative methods. Documentary analysis of the 
purchaser-provider contracts as well as other relevant 
regulation mechanisms could be matched with interviews 
to Regional ministers and managers, private providers and 
any other subject who could lead to better understanding of 
drivers, features and consequences of patient mobility. 
Patient Cross-Border Mobility and the Governance of a 
National Health Service 
According to the authors, interregional mobility trend did not 
diminish in the period 2000-2010; data analysis performed 
for 5 Regions with high inflow patient rates reports an 
increase in CBM from 2009-2011. Bearing in mind that, in 
most recent years, the difficult financial situation of many 
Southern Regions, along with the austerity policy caused by 
the economic and financial crisis, has led to cuts in service 
provision and capacity in many of the Regions with high 
patient outflows, we may expect mobility from Southern 
to Northern Italy to be actually increasing. Consequently, 
social and territorial inequalities linked to CBM have 
not diminished in the past decade and are now probably 
worsening, thus contributing to the general increase of 
the NHS historical North-South divide, in terms of service 
efficiency, access and quality.11 
When NHS regionalization was approved and initiated, 
the general expectation was that it would have triggered a 
reduction in the traditional territorial inequalities. Managerial 
autonomy and financial responsibility, especially after 2000 
tax reform, would have caused Regions with inefficient and 
low quality services to improve their Regional healthcare 
system by reducing service access and quality disparities. 
CBM regulation, based on a flat, DRG-specific and very 
expensive tariff, was a crucial part of this framework. On 
one hand, there are Regions with high patient outflows 
and negative mobility rate that pay for both their internal 
inefficiencies – hospitals with underutilized capacity and 
not completely covered fixed costs – and their patients’ 
expensively financed “escape.” On the other hand, Regions 
with high patient inflows and positive mobility rate benefit 
from good quality hospital systems meeting economies of 
scale and draining financial resources from the other Regions 
thanks to a small degree of outflows. Having a high level of 
patient outflows, CBM regulation should have prompted 
Southern Regions to arrange a good quality hospital system 
for acute care in order to reduce interregional patient mobility 
and consequently widen the historical gap with the Northern 
Regions. Evidence from literature and from this article shows 
that this did not happen. North-South inequalities in service 
access and quality have not reduced and probably have 
increased after regionalization,11 while CBM remained stable 
or even increased. 
Reasons for Southern Regions’ failure in reducing outpatient 
inflows and healthcare inequalities in general compared to 
Northern Regions is mainly due to how the Italian NHS was 
regionalized in the last 2 decades, as Brenna and Spandonaro 
suggest. After 1992 and subsequent reform programs, 
implementation of the accreditation system and of most of 
the organizational and regulation arrangements necessary to 
set up the RHSs were autonomously carried out at Regional 
level. Any form of planning, coordination or supervision by 
the Ministry of Health (MoH) and central government were 
substantially lacking in this process; as a result, differences 
in Regional administrative and governance capacity were 
emphasized and this reflected in the RHS organization and 
regulation. As regards mobility, no equitable allocation of 
hospital services was ensured, neither was uniformity in 
managing this issue at Regional level. 
The shift from managed competition to managed cooperation 
in 1999 minimized incentives for competition within each 
single Region8 but preserved them at interregional level. 
This process created favorable conditions for Northern 
Regions, boasting high quality hospital systems and higher 
administrative capacity, to carry out explicit or implicit CBM 
policies aimed at drawing resources from Southern Regions 
– with low quality hospital systems and lower administrative 
capacity. After this shift from managed competition to 
managed cooperation within each individual Region, 
private providers had more incentives to develop strategies 
for attracting patients from other Regions and Northern 
Regions supported this attitude. As a result, only apparently 
paradoxical, interregional competition among Regions 
replaced infra-regional competition.
If there is a shared opinion that CBM has to be significantly 
reduced, improving equity among citizens resident in 
different parts of Italy and, at the same time, promoting a 
new equilibrium in the real allocation of financial resources, 
central government is called to play a more active role in 
the NHS governance. The MoH should increase its widely 
neglected coordination and improve its steering role among 
Regions, as it seemed to have begun with the new “Pact for 
Health” signed in 2014. This new attitude should be broadly 
expressed in the State-Regions conference, namely the 
main Italian NHS joint-governing body.12 In this context, 
central government should foster interregional agreements, 
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mentioned by the authors and strongly recommended by 
us, and should incentivize and subsidize new investments in 
personnel, advanced technology and specialization within the 
hospital sector in the Southern Regions. 
Central government role looks crucial in managing the 
mobility phenomenon and in leveling healthcare inequalities 
between South and North. This seems to be true even in a 
decentralized healthcare system such as the Italian one. 
More than 20 years of decentralization showed that highly 
autonomous Regions, if left alone, are not able to solve these 
critical issues but rather tend to worsen them. This is a lesson 
that any policy-maker of any country, operating at national or 
subnational level, must learn. 
At the European level, Directive 2011/24 on the application of 
patient rights in cross-border healthcare provides important 
tools to manage patient mobility among European Union 
(EU) members, supporting the regulation of CBM, promoting 
cooperation among countries, clarifying responsibilities of 
member states, specifying patient rights and reimbursement 
rules as well as the possibilities for the member states to limit 
patient mobility, more clearly than in the past.13 Being more 
optimistic than Brenna and Spandonaro, and although some 
limits in the framework create difficulties in implementation, 
we can argue that the Directive provides the ground to national 
policy-makers and healthcare managers and professionals 
to reach an adequate regulation and management of patient 
mobility at EU level. 
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